Government always strikes hardest at who it views as the real enemy
Posted by aogThursday, 18 November 2010 at 19:41
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The best policy question concerning the current TSA full body searching is — is it OK to engage in the same level of search on anybody captured in Iraq and Afghanistan?
Monday, 22 November 2010 at 22:20|
Security expert …
That reference would be much more persuasive if he didn’t traffic in reasoning that would cause my dog to raise a Spockian eyebrow:
If they did catch someone, especially during the Bush years, you could be damned sure we’d know about it. And the fact that we didn’t means that there weren’t any.
Since 9/11, all airliners have intrusion resistant cockpit doors. Also, the hijack training for pilots has completely changed.
There have been no hijacking attempts since 9/11. Which means, according to your security expert, there haven’t been any, and, therefore, the IRCDs and training changes have been completely useless.
The panty bomber was relying upon that strategem because TSA efforts are ineffective?
(BTW, I after plowing through 20 pages of results on [“Rapiscan Secure 1000” explosive detection], I couldn’t find anything definitive that wasn’t a manufacturer claim to the contrary.)
I strongly disagree. If we really wanted to prevent crashing airliners, we could simply outlaw them. Yet we don’t, because the economic benefits of air travel outweigh the costs, even with splodeydopes.
You have fallen prey to the same approach I have seen almost everywhere else on this subject: you haven’t really specified what it is you want to prevent. Until you do quantified the risk you are willing to tolerate, then any discussion about the prevention cost is sterile.
Without any explicit mention, the US (and just about all other countries) has completely revised the allowable risk for hijackings. Pre 9/11, pilots were trained to accede to hijacker demands in order to preserve passenger lives.
It doesn’t matter how many passengers are getting killed in back, the pilots will put that plane on the nearest suitable piece of pavement, then disable it.
Obviously, that leaves the splodeydope problem untouched. There are two questions: How willing are we to lose an airplane over some period of time? And, how intrusive does an inspection regime need to be in order keep the risk of that loss where we want it? Look at it differently. What do you suppose the knock-on effects of losing four airplanes in a day would be? How much passenger screening are you willing to tolerate to prevent that?
In order to rationally answer those questions, the first thing we need to know is how much explosive of what type in what configuration is required to bring an airliner down (as opposed to killing some passengers, a risk we are accepting now).
I am purely guessing here, but I suspect that a body scanner will detect an amount of explosive in the proper configuration (it matters) required to cause structural failure, if outside the body. Further, I suspect that any explosive in body cavities will be of insufficient quantity to yield enough net energy to cause structural failure.
Consequently, I suspect that body scanners will sufficiently complicate the execution end of a splodeydope plot as to make it operationally prohibitive.
Just as IRCDs have done for hijackings.